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Both the Air Force and the Navy have separate service strategies which have been effective in articulating their perspectives and requirements. Currently, the Army does not espouse an independent strategy. This study will propose and analyze the effectiveness of an Army strategy within the framework of the national military strategy. The proposed strategy will focus on the strategic environment in the last decade of the twentieth century.
The author proposes that the Army develop a force development strategy rather than an operational strategy.
This strategy is based on several factors: the changing strategic environment, fiscal constraints, a lack of priority in the national military objectives, and the uncertainty of predicting and justifying a threat. 20 
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INTRODUCTION: THE WINDS OF CHANGE
The historic winds of change are creating a maelstrom of uncertainty in our national military strategy process. The Warsaw Pact's dissolution and the Soviet Union's revolutionary refocusing on internal political and economic reform have significantly reduced the threat to Western Eurov. Consequently, many American leaders and analysts support defense budget reductions because the Cold War has been won and Anerica must now solve critical domestic issues. These changes are shaking the foundation of Army force requirements-the defense of Europe.
As Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel stated, " events in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union have moved so rapidly that we have literally no time to be astonished." I As the entire world reels from these events, the winds of war blowing from the Persian Gulf are further complicating the strategic environment. An ad hoc coalition of 34 countries has successfully fought a limited war against Iraq and forced its withdrawal from Kuwait. Many believe this conflict is a precursor of conflict resolution in a newly emerging, multipolar world.
So how does this evolving world order affect the national interests of the United States? More importantly, how will the changing military balance and potential for military conflict affect the national military strategy and the Army's role in that strategy? These changes mandate alterations to the Army. Colonel (Ret.) Art Lykke believes this is essential:
As times change, national interests change, and our policies and military strategies should also change. This is easier said than done. Too otten military strategies and defense agreements remain locked in concrete even though the environment has been altered. 2
The Army approach can no longer be business as usual. Under the strategy of flexible response, the Army used an operational strategy based on forward deployment to deter the Soviet threat to !,Jestern
Europe. If this threat has significantly diminished,how does the Army justify its existence? I believe the Army must orient on a force deve;opment strategy focused on capabilities rather than a future undefined threat. Threat analysis will still be an integral part of the strategy formulation but it will not be the sole rationale for justification. Ad'nittedly, this will be difficult to justify to a Congress conditioned to a process that is based on a measurable threat and is often influenced more by parochial constituent interests rather than national defense interests.
I will propose that the Army adopt a global force development strategy as a strategic vision to focus the allocation of scarce resources and establish priorities among the variety of missions that evolve from the national military objectives. In the past, the Army proposed a force structure based on a perceived threat. This structure was then revised through a series of internal reviews by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense, and the Congress. Throughout this process, the budget was the predominant constraint. This inevitably resulted in a 'requirements-capabilities' mismatch. So why not consider the budget constraint at the beginning of the process?
Further, if resources are constrained, then missions must receive a priority. Every mission cannot be the number one priority.
If the national mi 1 tary strategy does not specify any priorities, then the Army must develop priorities, as a crucial first step in the strategy process.
Mr. Robert Komner states: " The essence of real-life strategic decision making is to face up to the hard choices among competing needs in the context of constrained resources...this dictates that we rank our strategic aims in order of priority for resource allocation." 3
To develop this strategy, I will assess the impact of the following elements: the strategic environment, US national interests, and the national military objectives. Based on these elements, I will formulate the ends, ways, and means of a global Army strategy. I will examine each concept (way) in terms of risk. That is, whether the ends can be achieved using the stated means.
THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONHENT
The economic, political, and military trends in both the international and domestic arenas comprise the strategic environment.
These elements are the broad areas in which nations interact and which influence national interests. International trends can create conflicts which could degenerate into armed conflict if a nation perceives its interests to be threatened. In addition to international trends,domestic trends also influence the formulation of national interests and shape how a nation will respond to conflict.
The world is becoming increasingly economically interdependent.
Developing economies create competing demands for scarce natural resources.
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Countries are no longer self-sufficient but they are inextricably linked In the Americas, the US efforts to stem narcotic production and trafficking are a major concern for the US government. For practically every Latin American country;reduction of foreign debt, currently 430 billion, will be the key economic issue in revamping economies. The
Enterprise for Americas Initiative, promoting a free trade zone from Alaska to Chile, will shape economic efforts in this hemisphere.
Migration and immigration from Central American countries to the United
States is increasing and is a significant factor in the US economy.
Thus, the hemisphere's focus will be on economic growth, reduction of the drug trade, and population stabilization.
Western Europe is trying to solidify a European Economic Community which will be a formidable economic power. Eastern European nations are trying to rebuild deteriorating economies and will need massive infusions of aid. Eastern European nations will be looking to Western
Europe and the rest of the world to provide the financial support and raw materials that were previously supplied by the Soviet Union.The Soviet Union's departure has given Europe an unexpected opportunity to revitalize the continent's economic posture, although it will be very costly.
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The Pacific has quietly emerged as an economic powerhouse. Actions by a smaller country can have a significant impact on a large nation's political fate. Traditional animosities will continue to foment in many regions of the world, and the United States will be confronted by the emergence of more assertive regional powers. 5
Third world nacions must rcspond to the prpssures o4 nationalism, religious fundamentalism, and citizens' expectations for self-determination. Insurgent forces in Africa, the Philippines, and the Americas pose a threat for emerging governments struggling to gain credibility and stability. Brazil, Israel, South Korea, China, and India will be able to produce ample supplies of weapons for other buyers. As the spread of weapons production capacity makes arms more of a buyer's market, the capacity of competing sellers and the advantaged buyers to do mischief will grow...the larger more sophisticated arsenals of regional military powers will also affect the conditions for US or Soviet intervention. Any intervention force designed to have a quick military effect will have to be large or have a large margin of superiority. 9
The increase in weapons production will have a long term impact on The US cannot and should not undertake them ( Third World conflicts) alone. In the emerging, decentralized world, no single power will play the kind of predominant part that was possible in the 19th and 20th centuries. It will be an era of diffused power. 11
The international trend toward economic intbrdependence will be complemented by a desire to gain support of the world community before emplo;,ing armed intervention.
In summary, the international arena presents a myriad of interwoven trends with implications for military strategy:
-The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact organization and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe.
-The economic and domestic turmoil within the USSR.
-A coalition force of Western and Arab nations fighting a limited war against Iraq.
-The inability of the major powers to control events in the Third
World.
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-The pressures of nationalismn, religious fundamentalism, and the desire for economic and political self-determination increasing the probability for armed confl ict in the Third World, -The Americas emerging as i new force in the US economy.
-The economic challenges of rebuilding Eastern Europe.
The US's domestic ervironment is just as dynamic, and perhaps more influential in shaping US interests and national military strategy. Now that the cold war has been won, US leaders want to place more emphasis on solving internal issues and reducing defense expenditures. This does not mean a return to 'isolationism' but; rather, a realization that resources can be channeled into other areas because of a diminished and changed threat from the Soviet Union.
The commitment of US forces to the Persian Gulf demonstrates some
American attitudes that will shape military strategy in the future. Once US forces are committed, the country wants to win quickly, decisively, and with the least possible cost in lives. Mr. Carl Builder, a strategist and analyst with the Rand Corporation, reinforces this observation:
The Army must prevail in order to meet public expectations in these so called low-intensity or Nth country conflicts, wars in which Soviet involvement is either indirect or negligible. The Army will not be measured by its ability to deter such wars, but by its ability to intervene effectively if they occur and American vital interests are at stake. 12
There is also a reluctance to use force because we cannot control all of the consequences of its use. The US public is doubtful of the utility of US military intervention and whether it can really solve a complex problem or simply exacerbate it.
As Jeffrey Record notes: -Many Americans regard most of the Third World as a place in which the US has no clear cut security interests worth fighting for." 13 The need to clearly justify the use of force as being in America's interests will be a crucial requirement for US leaders. The
American public is becoming much more sophisticated in distinguishing between "interests* and "vital interests' and which ones they are willing to support American soldiers dying to protect.
Another outgrowth of the Persian Gulf conflict is collective responsibility and bilateral action. The public does not want to be the N world's policeman'. They expect other nations to fully participate in their own defense and in conflicts like the Persian Gulf. There is growing support for Western European nations to assume more of the NATO defense role and to withdraw US forces from Europe. " The Europeans ought to be encouraged to pursue the development of their own military capability such that, at some point, they can assume independent responsibility for their defense and diplomacy.' 14 All of these attitudes indicate a desire, if not a necessity, for bilateral actions if the US leaders want public support for intervention.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMtIENT
There are some dominant themes emerging from the strategic environment which will influence an Army strategy in the 1990s and well into the 21st century. The Soviet conventional threat to Western Europe has significantly aiminished. Europe will have an internal focus attempting to rebuild the former Warsaw Pact countries' economies.
Also, German public pressure to reduce the US military presence will be a major political factor.
The growing potential for Third World conflicts will threaten US interests and increase the likelihood of US armed intervention.
Conversely, the reluctance of the American public to support armed intervention will influence US leaders' decisions. There will be growing domestic pressure to reduce defense spending and concentrate on internal problems.All of these trends will affect US interests and the national military strategy.
INITED STATES NATIONL INTERESTS
In an ideal world, national interests would not change and national military strategy would be stable. However, changes in the strategic environment and each administration's perception of US interests continually reshape America's national security policy. In the past, US policy seemed to evolve as a reaction to events. President George Bush made the first attempt to publish a national strategy when he published * The National Security Strategy of the United States" in March 1990. 1 will use this document as the source for developing current and future US national interests.
The military strategist's challenge is to translate broad, sometimes ambiguous, national interests into clearly defined military objectives or ends. In order to develop my Army strategy, I intend to examine these stated interests and objectives for missions which would apply to the Army.
In the above document, two issues appear to be vital US interests:
promote a free and open international economic system, and prevent any hostile power from dominating the Eurasian land mass. 15 These vital interests are further expanded into four national interests and further subdivided into nineteen objectives. While not explicitly stated, it implies that the US's strategy will still be containment but with a regional perspective because of the diminished Soviet threat to Europe.
Instead of containing Soviet expansion, the focus will be on containing aggression or unlawful expansion by regional powers.
Before proceeding any further, the term "vital interest" needs to be defined. Vital is attached when a policy maker desires to illustrate the intensity of a national interest. As Mr. Donald Nuechterlein states:
An interest is vital when the highest policy-makers in a sovereign state conclude that the issue at stake is so fundamental to the political, economic, and social well-being of their country that it should not be compromised-even if this may result in the use of economic and military sanctions. 16
As a result, the term vital is used to describe the consequences of the policy maker's decision when a conflict threatens a national interest. -deal effectively with threats to the security of the US and its citizens and interests short of armed conflict, including the threat of international terrorism.
improve strategic stability by strengthening conventional capabilities.
-reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the US.
2. A healthy and growing US economy to ensure individual prosperity and a resource base for national endeavors at home and abroad.
-ensure access to foreign markets, energy, and mineral resources.
-promote an open and expanding international economic system with minimal distortions to trade and investments.
3. A stable and secure world, fostering political freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions.
-maintain stable regional military balances to deter powers that might seek regional dominance.. -aid in combatting threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism, and illicit drug trafficking.
4. Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations. -strengthen and enlarge the commonwealth of free nations.
-support greater defense integration in Western Europe.
-work with the NATO alliance to bring about security and democracy in Europe.
This list does not include all of the US objectives. Rather, it only includes those which may involve the military element of power and more specifically; the Army.
REFINING US INTERESTS
While this list of interests and objectives is a good startpoint for the formulation of military objectives it is not complete.
One must examine current and past administrations' policy interpretations to determine how these broad interests and objectives are interpreted in the strategic environment. Hopefully, this analysis will provide clues as to which geographic area and countries are more important than others. Also, these interests must be studied in the framework of the changing strategic environment for the future. Ideally, there would be a priority, or degrees of intensity, among all of these interests and objectives. Obviously, survival is the first priority.
After that, it becomes, in reality, situational dependent.
The intensity of interests can be affected by a variety of factors: geographic location, treaty commitments, the presence of US forces, and the political and economic ties of a nation to the US. As an example, US ground forces maintain a forward presence in only two countries: Germany and South Korea. Forward presence implies that the US is willing to use force to deter aggression against these two countries. These factors can It should be possible for the United States, Japan, and China to provide jointly for South Korea's security, with the US ground contribution being reduced to a small force of about 5,000...the US should adjust its military role in NE Asia downward and encourage Japan and China also to increase their military cooperation. 19
Whether the US can convince China and Japan to provide major security assistance for Korea is certainly debatable. Of greater significance, what is Korea's own ability to shoulder some of the security load which could certainly 'free up' some US ground forces?
Preserving the sovereignty of democratic nations and US allies is another area which could necessitate the commitment of ground forces.
Pledges to Israel and Egypt will remain a cornerstone of US policy. 1. The US will continue to be a global superpower willing to use force to protect its interests.
2. Ground forces will maintain a reduced forward presence in Germany and South Korea.
3. The security of Germany, Japan, and South Korea will be vital interests o+ the US.
4. The Soviet Union remains the only nation that can destroy the US because of its nuclear capability.
5. The emergence of regional powers will affect military stabilty and threaten US and allied interests.
NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
The national military strategy has traditionally created a requirements versus capabilities mismatch. This mismatch has evolved because JCS planners use a worst case scenario that envisions simultaneous coflicts in separate theaters. This has been identified by the terms '1 1/2' or "2 1/2' wars involving a major conflict with the Soviet Union in Western Europe and a simultangous,lesser conflict, e.g.
a North Korean attack on South Korea.
The US in the postwar era (WWII) has never possessed military power sufficient to deliver on all its defense commitments overseas, and certainly not simultaneously. Realization of stated goals for a '2 1/2' war and even a "1 1/2' war capability has consistently eluded the Pentagon. 22
However, the diminished Soviet threat has lessened the probability of simultaneous conflicts. While our current national security strategy still plans for simultaneous conflicts, the President's decision to reduce defense expenditures may indicate less willingness to pay the costs of a multi-conflict capability. So, I propose that the reality of budget reductions is an acceptance of the sequential conflict approach. Reviewing this document reveals nine broad military objectives:
I. Deter war across the spectrum of conflict and, if this fails, terminate conflict on terms most favorable to the US.
Encourage political reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
3. Achieve mutually balanced and verifiable reductions of nuclear weapons.
4. Maintain stable alliance relationships.
Maintain global influence and freedom of action.
6. Protect free commerce and access to markets.
7. Stem drug flow into the US.
8.
Inhibit the proliferation of NBC weapons.
Prohibit the transfer of military technology to potential adversaries. 24
When these broad objectives are analyzed in the context of the changing strategic environment, the changing Soviet threat, the looming reduction in defense expenditures, and the evolution of US interests in a multipolar world the role of US Army forces begins to crystallize. The JMNA provides more broad guidance in relation to the above factors.
The US will continue to employ a strategy of flexible response with Thus, the Deiense Department has provided the Army a "mark on the wall' to organize its future force structure. The Army's challenge is to develop a strategy that applies these limited resources to achieve the req,!ired ends.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
It is in the area of conventional forces where the changing strategic environment and military balance will have the most impact. As Sir Michael Howard states: " It is this warfighting capability (conventional forces) that acts as the true deterrent to aggression and is the only one that is convertible to political influence." 28
Protecting US interests in a multipolar world demands lethal, deployable ground forces to deter or defeat aggression by regional powers.
Our flexible response strategy will continue to be a blend of nuclear and conventional forces. While our nuclear weapons are an effective deterrent against nuclear war, they will be ineffective against regional aggression and insurgencies. Richard Szafranski believes that we are entering an era when the likelihood for armed interventions to protect our nation's interests by affecting the affairs of other organized groups or states could increase. " It matters little whether we call this class of armeO intervention low-intensity conflict, or contingency and limited-objective warfare or some other name.* 29
Our strategy also required a large forward deployed force in
Western Europe under the nuclear umbrella. As General Carl Vuono, Army
Chief of Staff, points out, Flexible response has moved away from an exclusive reliance on nucleaweapons. It recognized the necessity for powerful conventional forces to protde forward oeployed units with a genuine capacity to contain and defeat aggression without irrediate and automatic escalation to nuclear war. 30
The question the Army must address is how large should the forward deployed force in Europe be) It appears that the national strategy is subtly shifting from forward defense to forward presence. This presense would be supported by rapidly deployable CONUS reinforcing units.
This shift to forward presence acknowledges the ange in the Soviet threat and evolving security relationships witr JS allies. It further recognizes that the most likely threats to US interests will be from regional struggles among developing nations ( Iran, Iraq, India, and Pakistan are current examples). Therefore, US forces will be more involved in contingency operations than ever before.
The final, and perhaps most significant implication is the movement to reduce the requirements versus capabilities mismatch. There is an implied assumption that regional conflicts will be sequential and the probability for horizontal escalation will be much lower. This will have an important impact on Army force planning. Jeffrey Record believes that:
A modest mismatch (between military objectives and capabilities) is also tolerable-even economically desirable-in peacetime, especially if force planning reflects a clear sense of strategic priorities and is predicated on sequential rather than simultaneous engagement of the designated threat. 31
Moreover, the pressure to reduce defense expenditures indicates an unwillingness to pay for large general purpose forces capable of engaging in simultaneous conflicts. Budget constraints do have an impact on national military strategy and must be considered. Mr. Earl Ravenal argues:
Our domestic system places constraints upon American power-not only its projection but its very generation. Domestic factors are assimilated into national strategies, whether the decision maker wills it or not. 32
ARMY STRATEGYt THE ART OF MAKING CHOICES
The Army strategy must be able to define the military objectives which will support our nat'onal interests based upon the guidance from the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Using these objectives, the Army must develop courses of action, in conjunction with each warfighting CINC, and allocate resources to implement the course of action. Jeffrey Record proposes that:
The essence of strategy at any level is the tailoring of goals to resources within a specific internal and external military environment.., strategy is the calculated relationship between purpose and power. It involves choices within a framework of finite resources, and an ability to distinguish between the essential and the expendable. 33
To build this framework, I will first outline the assumptions and the constraints which the Army strategy must consider. Next, I will propose the priorities for the national interests from the Army perspective. Once the assumptions, constraints, and priorities are presented, the framework for the Army strategy will be built. Using this framework, I will construct the military objective (end), military course of action (way) and military resources (means) required to support the national interest.
ASSULMPT IONS
Assumptions evolve from the analysis of the strategic environment.
For a future developmental strategy, the Army must make projections about the impact of the economic, political, and military changes which will affect force requirements. If any of the assumptions change, then the Army strategy must be revised.
Assumption #I. The US will continue to be a global power. That is, national policy will not return to "isolationism". The US public will reluctantly support armed intervention but it must be quick and decisive.
Assumption #2. The US will avoid unilateral action. Coalition warfare will become the preferred method of intervention.
Assumption #3. The US will have sufficient warning time to respond to a Soviet conventional threat to Western Europe. The probability of a surprise conventional attack is very low.
Assumption #4. Congress will approve the Defense Department's recommendation that the Army contain 20 divisions by 1996 with an end strength of 535,000.
Assumption #5. Regional conflicts will not escalate into a global war. US leadership will be able to use political influence, in conjunction with allies, to limit conflicts. The probability of conflict simultaneity will be low.
Assumption #6: The Soviet Union, because of its nuclear capability, will be the only nation that can threaten the survival of 24 the US as a nation. No country will have a ground force that can threaten the land mass of the US. Therefore, defense of the US against a ground attack will not be a primary requirement for Army forces. That is, CONUS based forces with force projection missions could assume this mission if necessary.
CONSTRAINTS
The Defense budget will not fund unlimited forces. The Army must allocate funds between force structure, readiness, modernization, and procurement. Further, Army forces will be required to fight across the entire spectrum of conflict from low to high intensity conflict.
Some presence will be required in Europe and South Korea. Whatever
Army course of action is recommended will determine the size of those forces. In order to meet all defense obligations, some dual commitment of forces may be necessary.
Strategic air and sea lift assets are limited. This will affect the mobility of CONUS based force projection units.
The peacetime budget is not designed to support a force structure to win a global war. If a global war erupts, then full mobilization is required to generate sufficient forces to successfully terminate this type of large scale conflict.
PRIORITIES: WHO'S ON FIRST?
Since strategy is the art of making choices in a constrained environment, an Army strategy must establish priorities among the national interests it must support.
Clearly, vital interests are the top priority since, by definition, these affect the survival of the country. After vital interests, importance becomes more debatable and depends upon the US leadership's policy interpretations. In reality, even vital interests are subject to change.
In reviewing US national interests and the netonal military objectives, I will use the following priority to develop an Army strategy.
Interest #1: Maintain the security of Western Europe.
Interest #2: Maintain the security of Japan.
Interest #3: Maintain the security of South Korea. The macro-perspective on planning US military forces may be the most ignored decision level... Judgments are required not only on the size and structure of the force, but also on the mix of force modernization, readiness, and sustainability. 34
Army forces must be mobile, flexible, sustainable, and technologically advanced. With a reduced budget, the Army strategy must identify how to attain these capabilities and rank their importance.
Tactical and strategic mobility will be the most critical capability in order to execute the force projection concept. The difficulty of predicting the future threat in regional conflicts, places greater importance on flexibility. For the Army, this translates into a mix of heavy, light, and special operations forces. Since the most likely conflict will probably occur in a region where the US does not have forward presence ground forces, the Army's capability to sustain ground forces in an austere environment is the next most important.
Finally, the Army must continue to develop technologically advanced weapons. Although this capability is the lowest priority, it does not diminish its significance. This means that procurement would not be funded as much as it could be. If horizontal escalation occurs, the European theater will be the main effort and economy of force operations will be conducted in other theaters.
Warning time creates the greatest risk for this concept. The Army's road to success has been quality soldiers with quality training and quality equipment. This focus must continue. By accepting reasonable risk in the changing strategic environment, the Army car free scarce dollars from force structure to improve mobility, readiness, sustainability, and equipment modernization.
This strategy also attempts to free the Army from the albatross of a threat based force structure. While the threat estimate is important, it should not be the ultimate discriminator. Force capability is just as important, if not more so. The recent Persian Gulf War is an excellent example of the weaknesses of the threat based approach. On paper, the Iraqi army outnumbered the coalition forces and appeared to be super or.
The test of combat disproved this theory.
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in the next two decades, the most likely conflict will be a limited .. ar erupting from the clashes of developing nations. These countries will have modern, lethal weapons and significant ground forces. If these conflicts threaten US interests, the Army will ultimately have to terminate the conflict on favorable terms. The Army must be ready to fight. As T. R. Fehrenbach so poetically observed:
You may fly over a land forever. You may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it, and wipe it clean of life. But if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did-by *outting your young men into the mud. 36
